The paper examines the e¤ect of ambiguity on contests where multiple parties expend resources to win a prize. We develop a model where contenders perceive ambiguity about their opponents' strategies and determine how perceptions of ambiguity and attitudes to ambiguity a¤ect equilibrium choice. The paper also investigates how equilibrium under ambiguity is related to behavior where contenders have expected utility preferences. Our model can explain experimental results such as overbidding and overspreading relative to Nash predictions.
Introduction
Many important economic interactions can be modelled as contests where participants expend resources to obtain a single or multiple prizes and both winners and losers forfeit the resources expended to win the contest. 1 A common example is a political election where two or more candidates compete for a political o¢ ce. The relevant resources in this case are the campaign expenditures of the candidates. A given candidate's probability of success is higher the more (s)he spends on his/her campaign. However, it is a decreasing function of campaign expenditures by his/her opponents. Theoretical and empirical advances in the literature on contests have led to a better understanding of the strategic forces and tradeo¤s in these important economic environments and to recommendations for improving upon outcomes. However, there is a stark dissonance between a number of standard theoretical results and the experimental and empirical evidence which jeopardizes the practical import of the theory.
Recent experimental research 2 reveals that average expenditure to win the prize is signi…cantly higher than the Nash prediction (commonly referred to as overbidding) and the variance of expenditure across experimental subjects is considerable (overspreading). In some experiments, the extent of overbidding is so prominent that the average earnings are nega- exhibit loss aversion (Kong, 2008) . 1 Applications of contest theory include rent-seeking, beauty contests and in ‡uence activities, internal labor market tournaments, litigation, R&D and patent races, …nancing of public goods, marketing campaigns, military con ‡ict, political competition, and sporting contests. 2 See Dechenaux et al. (2012) for an extensive survey of the experimental research on contests.
Di¤erences in these behavioral traits can also explain, at least in theory, a part of the large variation in expenditure of experimental subjects. The overspreading has also been linked to variation in risk aversion and demographic characteristics of experimental subjects.
We propose that these phenomena may be a response to ambiguity. Speci…cally we argue that participants in a contest may perceive ambiguity about their opponents' actions and study how perceptions of ambiguity and attitudes to ambiguity a¤ect equilibrium behavior.
A decision-maker has an ambiguous belief if it is not precise enough to be represented by a single (objective or subjective) probability distribution as in the expected utility model (Savage, 1954) or, more generally, as in the probabilistically sophisticated model (Machina and Schmeidler, 1992) . In his pioneering study, Ellsberg (1961) argued that individuals will exhibit behavior that reveals preferences which di¤erentiate between risk (known probabilities) and ambiguity (unknown probabilities). The prevalence of Ellsberg-type behavior in experimental and naturally occurring settings 3 and the inability of Savages' subjective expected utility theory to explain it have stimulated e¤orts to develop and axiomatize alternative models of decision-making. 4 Applications of these models have led to novel insights and prescriptions for numerous economic environments (Gilboa, 2012; Etner et al., 2012) .
One of the most popular and promising of these models is Choquet expected utility (henceforth CEU), where decision-makers'beliefs are characterized by non-additive probabilities (or capacities); see Schmeidler (1986 Schmeidler ( , 1989 . A CEU decision-maker maximizes the expected value of a utility function with respect to a non-additive belief where the expectation is expressed as a Choquet integral (Choquet, 1953-4) . CEU is a generalization of subjective expected utility. It has the advantage of maintaining the separation of beliefs and outcome evaluation, which makes the theory easily amenable to various applications.
To preserve a clear separation between the degree of perceived ambiguity and ambiguity attitude, we further assume CEU preferences with neo-additive capacities (Chateauneuf et al., 2007) .
Our interest in the e¤ect of ambiguity on behavior in contests is not solely driven by …nd-ing a new explanation for overbidding and overspreading. Rather, our primary motivation is that it may be intrinsically di¢ cult for contest participants to attach unique probabilities to the behavior of other contenders. In other words, participants in many real-world contests may perceive ambiguity about their opponents' choices and contenders' attitudes to ambiguity, such as optimism and pessimism, may be at play. Thus, we argue that the new explanation is very plausible.
There are at least three reasons why ambiguity may play a central role in contests.
Contests are frequently unique events so that past contests are of little help in predicting the chances of winning in the current event. For example, many military con ‡icts and rent-seeking contests have numerous idiosyncratic features. In the case of military con ‡ict, there are often signi…cant changes in military technology between major wars. Similarly, rent-seeking contests frequently take place under di¤erent circumstances on each occasion.
Second, and somewhat related to the previous point, many contests studied in the literature involve very complex systems such as intricate legal cases, R&D investments in advanced technologies, and political competitions that depend on numerous factors. Finally, contests involve strategic interactions by humans whose possible behavior may be intrinsically di¢ -cult to assess in the form of unique probabilities. To be more speci…c about pertinence of ambiguity in economic environments, we illustrate with the following examples.
Consider a competition where multiple candidates expend resources to win a political o¢ ce. Each politician has multiple instruments at her/his disposal to a¤ect the outcome of an election including the amount, timing, and type of advertising 5 , campaign promises, and debate strategies. A candidate will condition her/his actions to win the election on expectations of what her/his opponents might do. The standard approach to analyzing this strategic environment hinges upon the assumption that each contender's strategy is conditioned on predictions of the opponents'choices represented by a unique probability distribution and that the equilibrium beliefs are correct. That is, contestants are assumed to behave according to the prescriptions of Nash equilibrium. In reality, a contender may entertain multiple scenarios about the strategies that will be employed by her political opponents. For ex- 5 One of the key decisions in political advertising is the choice of issues which to focus on.
ample, under one scenario a contestant's opponents pursue a relatively negative campaign with a relatively large likelihood while under a di¤erent scenario the likelihood of a negative campaign by the opponents is relatively small. In other words, a contender may be unable to assign a unique probability to each course of action by her/his opponents. 6 As another example consider a litigation process where the opposing sides spend resources to a¤ect the outcome of the process in their favor. Does a party to a litigation process have a "clear"idea, in probabilistic sense, about the strategy that will be followed by the opponent?
For many cases that are not settled prior to going to court and are not characterized by "regular motions", a considerable amount of ambiguity may be present about strategies that will be followed by the opposing side 7 and this ambiguity is likely to a¤ect the litigating sides'actual behavior.
Finally, consider a typical experiment testing predictions for a lottery game where experimental subjects acquire lottery tickets and a participant's probability of winning the lottery is equal to the ratio of the number of tickets (s)he has purchased to the total number of tickets sold. A subject in this type of experiment is likely to be uncertain about the number of lottery tickets that will be purchased by the other participants. (S)he may entertain a range of possibilities for the number of tickets that are bought by her opponents.
Furthermore, it is not at all clear that (s)he will assign a unique probability to each of these possibilities. (S)he may very well contemplate a set of likelihoods for some of the prospects.
In other words, the subject's beliefs may be ambiguous. The subjects may not only perceive ambiguity about the opponents'possible play but may also exhibit sensitivity to this
ambiguity. An optimistic player (or, equivalently, an ambiguity-loving decision-maker) will expect her opponents to buy a relatively small number of tickets. In contrast, a pessimist (or an ambiguity-averse decision-maker) will expect her opponents to buy a relatively large number of tickets. As a result, an increase in the magnitude of ambiguity may have very 6 In addition to predicting the opponents'behavior, candidates also need to take into account the behavior of potential voters. This may also involve considerable degree of ambiguity from the perspective of contenders and pundits alike. For example, turnout of di¤erent segments of voters may be hard to predict which complicates the task of targeting di¤erent fragments of the electorate. Although we don't explicitly model this type of ambiguity, the techniques in the present paper can be rather easily extended to address this scenario. 7 The probability of a favorable verdict may also be ambiguous because the litigating parties are likely to have little information about the disposition of the judicial body rendering the verdict. di¤erent e¤ects on pessimistic and optimistic contenders.
We develop a model where contenders perceive ambiguity about strategies that are used by their opponents. We prove existence of equilibrium under ambiguity and determine how the degree of ambiguity regarding other participants'strategies and preferences toward ambiguity a¤ect equilibrium behavior. The paper also investigates how equilibrium under ambiguity is related to behavior where contenders have expected utility preferences. Finally, the model in the present paper can explain overbidding and overspreading, relative to the Nash prediction, which are commonly observed in experimental studies of contests.
The model
Consider a contest with n 2 players. To improve her chances of winning the prize each contestant i 2 f1; 2; :::; ng chooses action
; where x i 0 and 1 > x i > 0:
On occasion, we will refer to these actions as e¤ort or expenditure invested in the contest.
The bounds on e¤ort may be subjective, i.e. they represent the opponents' beliefs about a player's potential choices. For many competitive environments, it is sensible to expect that players will not anticipate that all of their opponents will choose zero e¤ort; x i > 0 for some or even all i. On a more formal level, the scenario where (x i = 0 for all i) is non-generic in the sense that it has a measure zero in the space of all possible beliefs. It is equally reasonable to believe that contenders will have a certain …nite upper bound on the opponents'expenditures that will not be exceeded by the other players.
The assumption that the expenditure to win the contest may be constrained from above also accounts for possibilities of budget-constrained participants 8 and for possible exogenous restrictions on the level of expenditures in the contest (e.g., an upper threshold on expenditures set by a "contest designer"). We also model lower bounds on expenditures because in many actual contests there is often a good reason to believe that some contender(s) who decide to participate will spend at least a certain amount on winning the prize. For example, in many presidential elections candidates receive public funds to compete. These serve as a lower bound on the amount that the candidates will spend on their election campaigns.
The cost of action x i is given by x i and incurred irrespective of the contest's outcome.
The probability that contestant i receives the prize, the contest success function (CSF), is given by
if 9j 2 f1; :::; ng such that x j > 0 1 n if x j = 0 for all j 2 f1; :::; ng ;
where x i x 1 ; :::; x (i 1) ; x (i+1) ; :::; x n denotes the vector of action choices by all players except for contestant i: The set of strategy combinations of player i's opponents is denoted by X i and the set of strategy combinations of all players is denoted by X. We also let x denote the vector of action choices by all participants in the contest; x (x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x n ) :
The function h i ( ) (i = 1; :::; n) is assumed to be increasing in its argument. Under this assumption, p i is increasing in own action and decreasing in the actions of the opponents.
It is also assumed that h i ( ) is concave and twice-continuously di¤erentiable and h i (0) = 0 for all i = 1; :::; n. The assumption of concavity of
for all x i > 0 and all x i : Contestant i's utility function is given by
where V i denotes the value of the prize to contestant i: The assumption that the contenders are risk neutral is made primarily with the purpose of focusing on the e¤ect of ambiguity aversion. Our results carry over to a more general setting with risk averse preferences under appropriate qualifying conditions.
The contest considered in the paper falls into a general category of aggregative games (Selten, 1970; Okuguchi, 1993 i of the opponents'actions. The cross-partial derivative of contender i's utility function with respect to own and opponent k's actions is equal to
where
It follows from the expression for
that the marginal bene…t of own action
is decreasing in opponent k's action when player i's opponents choose relatively large actions
However, it is increasing when the opponents choose relatively small actions
. In other words, when the aggregate of a player's opponents'e¤orts is su¢ ciently large, an increase in any opponent's e¤ort will crowd out the player's e¤ort (the player will partially give in). On the other hand, when the aggregate of a player's opponents'e¤orts is su¢ ciently small, the player will respond to an increase in any opponent's e¤ort by increasing her e¤ort (the player will keep up). Thus, this game does not globally exhibit either strategic complementarity or strategic substitutability (Bulow et al., 1985) . Note also that when all players have the same function h j and choose the same action, the strategies of the players are (local) strategic substitutes.
Suppose that the contenders perceive ambiguity about their opponents'choice of action. This ambiguity is represented by a capacity which re ‡ects the weights a player places on di¤erent strategies of the opponents. A capacity is similar to a subjective probability with the exception that it may be non-additive. We restrict our attention to the case where the ambiguity for contestant i is represented by a neo-additive capacity 9 v i de…ned on the set of the opponents'strategies X i :
where i ; i 2 [0; 1] and i is a standard probability distribution on X i : Contestant i has some doubts that the probability distribution i ( ) is the true probability distribution over the opponents'strategies and this ambiguity is re ‡ected by the parameter i : Parameter i characterizes contestant i's ambiguity attitude. We provide a more detailed discussion of parameters i and i after fully characterizing players'preferences. The support of a neoadditive capacity v i is de…ned by supp(v i ) = supp( i ). 10 We focus on neo-additive capacities because they o¤er a clear-cut separation of ambiguity perception from ambiguity attitude and allow for both ambiguity-averse and ambiguity-loving decision-makers. 11;12 Moreover, contests have focal best and worst outcomes, which makes neo-additive capacities particularly suitable for analysis.
It is assumed that all participants in the contest have Choquet expected utility (CEU)
preferences (Schmeidler, 1986 (Schmeidler, , 1989 ) with a neo-additive capacity:
The function M i (x i ) represents the best possible scenario of player i's opponents'choices for player i while m i (x i ) corresponds to the worst possible scenario.
A neo-additive capacity has the following intuitive interpretation and behavioral implications. A decision-maker with CEU preferences and a neo-additive capacity has subjective beliefs characterized by the additive probability distribution i ( ) but lacks con…dence in this 10 For further justi…cation of this de…nition of support of a capacity, see Eichberger and Kelsey (2014) . 11 See Eichberger et al. (2011) for a discussion of this issue. 12 Most of the results in the present paper can be generalized to a setting where beliefs are in the class of JP-capacities (Ja¤ray and Philippe, 1997, Eichberger and Kelsey, 2014). 13 Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant (2007) provide an axiomatic foundation of CEU preferences with a neo-additive capacity.
belief. When i = 0; the decision-maker is certain in her probabilistic assessment i ( ) and, as a result, has expected utility preferences. In contrast, when i > 0; (s)he will take into account the e¤ect of her actions on the best and worst outcomes. The larger the parameter i ; the greater the weight that the decision-maker will place on these two extreme outcomes and the larger the deviation from the expected utility preferences. Thus, it is natural to interpret i as measuring ambiguity, and we shall refer to it as the degree of ambiguity. The decision-maker's reaction to uncertainty about beliefs has optimistic and pessimistic traits.
The optimistic trait is re ‡ected by the weight on the best outcome M i (x i ), measured by i (1 i ) ; while the pessimistic trait is given by the weight on the worst outcome m i (x i ) ; measured by i i . Relatively high (low) values of i correspond to pessimistic (optimistic) attitudes to ambiguity. Thus, parameter i is referred to as the degree of pessimism (or degree of ambiguity aversion).
Substituting from (2) into (4), we obtain:
We assume that, given the structure of the game, the i ( )s are determined endogenously while the degrees of optimism, i , and ambiguity, i , are treated as exogenous parameters. A decision-maker's attitude towards ambiguity i is a personal trait akin to tastes in a standard consumer problem. Thus, it is reasonable to suppose that it is independent of the decision problem and exogenous in ‡uences.
De…ne the best-response correspondence of player i; given that her/his beliefs are represented by a neo-additive capacity
We adopt the following de…nition from Eichberger and Kelsey (2014), which is an extension of an earlier work in Dow and Werlang (1994): is an Equilibrium Under Ambiguity (EUA) if for all i = 1; ::; n, ?
Ifx i 2 supp (v i ) for all i = 1; 2; ::; n; then (x 1 ;x 2 ; :::;x n ) is called an equilibrium strategy pro…le. If supp (v i ) contains a single vectorx i for each player i = 1; 2; :::; n; we will say thatx is a singleton equilibrium.
Thus, an equilibrium is characterized by a capacity for each player. The support of this capacity consists of strategies that are best responses for the opponents.
Consider the game In light of the established relationship between the equilibria under ambiguity of the game G and Nash equilibria of the perturbed game, we examine the pure strategy equilibria of the latter game. Since the payo¤ function of the perturbed game can be written as
the perturbed game represents a contest where player i's probability of winning the prize is equal to
and the value of the prize is equal to V i : The latter expression reveals that the incen-tives to invest in the contest come through three di¤erent channels; the optimistic scenario
Player i's best response function 15 for
The form of the best response function in (5) follows from the strict concavity of p i (x i ; x i ) in x i for all x i > 0 and all x i and the resultant strict concavity of the objective function in (5): It is also true that player i's best response function is continuous for
In the Appendix we prove that this strategic interaction has a singleton EUA:
:::; n and x = 1 P j6 =1 h j x j ; :::; n P j6 =n h j x j is a pure strategy equilibrium of the perturbed game:
Proof. See Appendix.
This singleton equilibrium is the ambiguous equivalent of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. There may be other equilibria under ambiguity, in which there are two or more strategies in the support of the players'beliefs. These correspond to mixed strategy Nash equilibria. We focus on the singleton equilibrium since, even in the absence of ambiguity, the interpretation of mixed equilibrium is problematic. Since players are indi¤erent between all of the strategies to which they assign a positive probability they have no incentive to play the strategy which sustains the mixed equilibrium (see, e.g., Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994 ).
In the presence of ambiguity the issues are even more complicated since one would need to determine what it means for a player to use an ambiguous randomizing device to select his strategy. However, given that (the analogies of) pure strategy equilibria always exist in our model, it is desirable to avoid these issues by con…ning attention to such equilibria. 15 Acemoglu and Jensen (2013) call it a "reduced" best-reply function.
Symmetric case
We begin with an analysis of a symmetric contest where all of the players have the same value of the prize, the same contest success function, the same lower and upper bounds on contest expenditures, and the same degrees of pessimism:
16;17
Suppose also that h (x) = x , where 1 (Tullock, 1967 (Tullock, , 1980 ): There are a number of reasons we examine symmetric contests. First, they are more tractable. Second, they are more illustrative of how the degrees of ambiguity and ambiguity aversion a¤ect behavior in contests. Third, many experimental studies entail various symmetry assumptions and we are interested in juxtaposing our …ndings to the received experimental evidence. 18 In a symmetric equilibrium, x 1 = ::: = x n x : From the …rst-order conditions in (5), we obtain an implicit expression for the unique interior symmetric equilibrium (when it exists) 19 : 16 We only focus on the comparative statics for the parameters that distinguish our framework from the received literature, namely, those that are associated with ambiguity about opponents' behavior. The comparative statics …ndings for other parameters, such as the value of the prize to a player or the number of contenders, are o¤ered by the existing literature (e.g., Nti, 1997 , Hurley and Shogren, 1998 , Yamazaki, 2008 , and Acemoglu and Jensen, 2013). 17 The games considered in the present paper fall into the category that Acemoglu and Jensen (2013) coin "nice"aggregative games. However, their results are not applicable to the parameters of interest in our model, since neither nor are, what they call, "positive shocks" for our payo¤ functions. 18 It is of course very unlikely that all of the participants in a contest will perceive the same degree of ambiguity and have the same degree of ambiguity aversion. The assumption that all players have the same perception of ambiguity and attitude to ambiguity is a simplifying assumption. We relax this assumption in later sections of the paper. 19 Existence and uniqueness of an interior symmetric equilibrium is guaranteed by imposing restrictions on the lower and upper bounds for x and other parameters of the model: The comparative statics analysis is straightforward when either all of the players choose the lower bound on expenditure or all of the players choose the upper bound. For this reason, we focus on the interior solutions.
Equilibrium e¤ort under Nash and ambiguity and the e¤ect of the degree of ambiguity on equilibrium e¤ort
The e¤ect of the degrees of ambiguity on the equilibrium e¤ort is characterized in the following:
Proposition 3 The equilibrium e¤ort x under ambiguity will decrease in the degree of ambiguity if and only if the equilibrium e¤ort x N (n 1) n 2 V without ambiguity exceeds the equilibrium e¤ort x under ambiguity:
In the Appendix we also demonstrate that condition (7) holds if and only if
which reveals how the model parameters a¤ect the relationship between the degree of ambiguity and the equilibrium e¤ort x . Under both inequality (7) and its reverse, an increase in ambiguity widens the gap between the equilibrium e¤ort under ambiguity and the Nash prediction. If the ambiguity attitude of the contenders (and other parameters of the model)
is such that the equilibrium e¤ort under ambiguity exceeds the Nash prediction x N ; then an increase in the degree of ambiguity will widen this gap by increasing the equilibrium e¤ort under ambiguity. (7) that if
then there is a threshold level of the degree of ambiguity aversion such that x is increasing in if and only if the participants have a degree of ambiguity aversion that is smaller than that threshold level. Conversely, if the reverse of inequality (9) holds then x is increasing in if and only if the participants have a degree of ambiguity aversion that is higher than some threshold level of ambiguity aversion.
It also follows from condition (8) that the equilibrium e¤ort x either increases in the degree of ambiguity for all or decreases in the degree of ambiguity for all : Equivalently, whether the contenders underinvest or overinvest relative to the Nash equilibrium is independent of the degree of ambiguity 2 (0; 1) :
Finally, consider the case where = 1. This is a simple lottery frequently explored in experimental studies: The parameter x may represent the subjects'endowment of experimental currency. Suppose also that the participants in the lottery believe that their opponents will buy at least x > 0 lottery tickets. Under this scenario, a contender's equilibrium e¤ort under ambiguity will exceed the Nash equilibrium if and only if
It follows from this expression that if the upper threshold x is relatively large compared to the lower threshold x, then the equilibrium e¤ort under ambiguity will exceed the Nash Proposition The relationship between the number of contenders and overinvestment is also sensible.
The potential for overinvestment comes from the optimistic channel and this channel is most in ‡uential when the number of players is neither too small nor too large. 21 Proposition 4
illustrates that both the mechanism through which the number of opponents a¤ects equilibrium investments and the resultant comparative statics results for contests with non-linear probability weighting and our model are di¤erent. Baharad and Nitzan (p. 2055, 2008) …nd that for contests with relatively large numbers of contestants, " ...the individuals tend to be optimistic, that is, the conceived winning probability is higher than the objective probability and this induces them to increase their e¤ort su¢ ciently such that the contested rent is over-dissipated." The "optimistic" trait in our model has a di¤erent interaction with the number of contestants. 21 For more on this intuition, see our discussion following Proposition 8.
As a numerical illustration of Proposition 4, consider the parameterization V = x = 100 and = 0:05: The EUA exceeds the Nash equilibrium under the following scenarios, for Finally, when the degree of pessimism exceeds 0:45; the Nash equilibrium is greater than the EUA for any number of players.
Degree of pessimism and equilibrium e¤ort
We now turn to the relationship between the equilibrium e¤ort and the contenders' pessimism. A change in the degree of pessimism shifts the weight between the pessimistic and optimistic channels, leaving the standard channel intact. The overall e¤ect depends on which of these channels provides stronger incentives to invest in the contest. Formally, we have:
The equilibrium e¤ort x under ambiguity will increase in the degree of pessimism if and only if
which holds if and only if
It follows immediately from (12) that:
Corollary 6 The equilibrium e¤ort x under ambiguity will decrease in the degree of pessimism if and only if (i) the value of the prize V is su¢ ciently small, and/or (ii) the number of contestants n is su¢ ciently large, and/or (iii) the lower bound x on e¤ort is su¢ ciently large, and/or (iv) the upper bound x on e¤ort is su¢ ciently large.
To gain intuition into the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the equilibrium e¤ort to be decreasing in the degree of pessimism, recall the three channels through which changes in the parameters a¤ect the incentives to invest in the contest; the optimistic, pessimistic, and standard channels. Consider a decrease in the value of the prize V: The incentives to invest for all three channels will decrease. Moreover, the disincentives to invest associated with the pessimistic channel will be more prominent for a lower value of the prize. Hence, the equilibrium e¤ort will be lower for contests with relatively pessimistic contenders and low When all contenders have the same value of the prize, V 1 = = V n V; we will focus on an equilibrium where all contenders of the same type choose the same action;
x 1 = ::: = x m x A and x m+1 = ::: = x n x B : From the …rst-order conditions in (5), the equilibrium actions (x A ; x B ) for an interior equilibrium in this case are implicitly given by the following system of equations 22 :
The model with two contenders
The assumption of two contenders allows for an informative graphical illustration of the comparative statics for ambiguity attitude and degree of ambiguity. We begin with the case where there is one player of each type, players A and B; and suppose, without loss of generality, that winning the contest is worth at least as much to player A as to player B:
Hence, the value of the prize to the two individuals is given by V A = V and V B = V; where 0 6 6 1:
As a benchmark, we continue to use the Nash equilibrium which in this case is given by: : Thus, the symmetric contest produces the highest e¤ort levels. This arises because competition is more intense in a symmetric contest. The marginal bene…t of e¤ort is greater when a player is level with his/her opponent than when (s)he is clearly ahead or clearly behind.
Assume that the set of feasible strategies may be written in the form [ V; V ] ; where
and > Proof. See Appendix.
Thus, in any EUA both players provide less e¤ort than the Nash equilibrium e¤ort level of the player with the highest value of the prize. Hence, ambiguity causes player A to choose lower e¤ort than her Nash equilibrium level. In contrast, player B may provide more or less e¤ort than her Nash level. It is straightforward to construct examples where the player with the lower valuation of the prize overbids compared to Nash.
It follows immediately from Proposition 7 that:
Corollary 8 Suppose that both players perceive a positive degree of ambiguity ( A ; B > 0) and have the same value of the prize V . Then, in an EUA both players will make strictly less than the Nash equilibrium level of contributions
The intuition behind this …nding is as follows. Recall that the incentives to invest come through three channels. The pessimistic and optimistic channels produce incentives to invest that are lower than the incentives for the game without ambiguity. A complete pessimist believes that her opponent will choose a very large investment. In this case, the marginal product of the player's e¤ort is relatively low since (s)he believes that (s)he will likely lose the contest unless (s)he invests a very large amount. The marginal product of e¤ort is also relatively low for an optimist since there is only one opponent and optimism causes a player to overweight low e¤ort from her opponent. 23 In this case, the player believes that (s)he can win the contest without much e¤ort. Ambiguity causes the decision-maker to overweight both possibilities. As a result, the equilibrium expenditures under ambiguity are lower than in the Nash equilibrium. In the following section we show that, even with symmetric valuations, the EUA can exceed the Nash equilibrium in games with more than two contenders.
We now turn to the comparative statics. For space considerations, in the rest of the paper we focus on the case where all players have the same value of the price.
In a contest with two contenders, player A's and B's best response functions, A (x B ) and B (x A ) ; for interior solutions are given by the unique solutions to the corresponding equations in (13) As a starting point in the comparison of equilibrium e¤orts we take a two-player symmetric contest where both players perceive the same degree of ambiguity and have the same degree of pessimism : For such contests, we have:
: Then, the two-player symmetric contest has a unique equilibrium. Moreover, this equilibrium is symmetric and interior.
; both players will choose the lowest possible expenditure x:
We sidestep this uninteresting case and instead focus on interior solutions in the rest of this section. It follows immediately from Propositions 3 and 8 that for a symmetric contest with two contenders, the unique equilibrium e¤ort is a strictly decreasing function of the common degree of ambiguity : Proposition 5 in turn implies that for a symmetric two-contender contest the symmetric equilibrium will be a decreasing function of the common degree of ; the extra weight on the worst outcome a¤ects the marginal bene…t more than the reduction of the weight on the best outcome.
We demonstrate in the Appendix (see Lemma 13) that the best response functions are single-peaked with the peak located at the unique symmetric equilibrium (see Figure 3 and the following proposition). Using this property of the best response functions, we can Proof. See Appendix.
An increase in ambiguity perceived by Player i causes her to put more weight on the possibility that her opponent will choose very high expenditure x or very low expenditure x.
This decreases player i's perceived marginal bene…t and, as a result, reduces her equilibrium e¤ort. Since the competition from player i has become less intense, player j 6 = i responds by decreasing her e¤ort as well. However, to stay ahead of her opponent in terms of having a higher probability of winning, player j reduces e¤ort by less than player i. Thus, an increase in player i's degree of ambiguity renders a strategic advantage to player j and improves the latter player's payo¤. Proposition 10 also implies that when the two contenders are involved in a rent-seeking activity (Tullock, 1967) , an increase in ambiguity perceived by either player will decrease the amount of rent dissipation. This may explain why in practice rent dissipation is not full, contrary to Tullock's predictions. 24 It is implicitly assumed that an increase in the degree of ambiguity from to 0 is relatively small. See the proof of the following proposition for more details.
Consider
0 , where i; j 2 fA; Bg and i 6 = j: Conducting analysis similar to that for the previous proposition, we obtain: 25 Proposition 11 An increase in player i's (i 2 fA; Bg) degree of ambiguity aversion starting from a symmetric contest will decrease both players' equilibrium e¤orts; x 0 k < x k for k 2 fA; Bg. Moreover, the resulting reduction in player i's e¤ort will exceed the reduction in
The model with more than two players
We now return to the general case and suppose that there are m identical ambiguity averse contenders and (n m) identical ambiguity loving contenders. Figure 4 depicts the relationship between the number m of ambiguity averse contenders and the equilibrium expenditures of representative ambiguity averse and ambiguity loving contenders for a speci…c parameterization of our model. In this case, irrespective of the fraction of ambiguity averse players the equilibrium expenditure of ambiguity averse contenders is below the Nash equilibrium level (which is equal to 8) while the equilibrium expenditure of ambiguity loving contenders is above it. Note also that as the number of ambiguity averse players monotonically increases, both contender types increase their equilibrium expenditures.
The results reported in Figure 4 and, more generally, our …ndings in the previous sections demonstrate that perceptions and attitudes to ambiguity provide an explanation for overspreading frequently observed in experiments. A signi…cant diversity of ambiguity attitudes, which is frequently observed in the lab (see, e.g., Halevy, 2007) , can lead to considerable variations of actual investments in contests.
Contrasting these and Section 3's …ndings with those in Section 4.1, the reader will have noticed that there is a di¤erence between the results for two-player contests and multi-player contests (by a multi-player contest we mean three or more players.). In two-player symmetric contests ambiguity always gives rise to e¤ort levels below the Nash equilibrium. In contrast, in multi-player contests ambiguity can give rise to overbidding. of the total e¤ort and thus has a relatively low (around 20%) chance of winning.
Thus (s)he has a relatively low marginal bene…t of e¤ort. Now assume that a given player is ambiguity loving. Then (s)he will place positive decision weight on the possibility that his/her rivals will supply very low e¤ort. This will increase his/her marginal bene…t since it reduces the gap between the given individual's e¤ort and the aggregate e¤ort of the others. Suppose the given individual is very optimistic and takes this low level to be 1 4 of the equilibrium e¤ort. Then (s)he will perceive him/herself to be in a roughly equal contest with the aggregate of the other players. As a result, his/her marginal bene…t of e¤ort will be relatively high.
Conclusion
The paper developed and analyzed contests where contenders perceive ambiguity about strategies of their opponents. In addition to proving existence of equilibrium under ambiguity and exploring its uniqueness properties, we have investigated how the degree of ambiguity regarding other participants'strategies and preferences toward ambiguity a¤ect equilibrium behavior. The paper also established a relationship between the equilibrium under ambiguity and Nash equilibrium. The paper belongs to a rapidly expanding literature on strategic interactions under ambiguity (see, e.g, Lo, 1998 , Bose et al., 2006 , Kellner, 2015 , and Hanany et al., 2016 . On a technical level, our paper contributes to the literature on the monotone comparative statics since we extend the analyses to games that have neither strategic substitutes nor strategic complements. 26 Our results suggest that relatively optimistic players tend to invest more than their pessimistic counterparts. Pessimists over-weight the event that their opponents will provide high e¤ort which mutes incentives to expend resources. In contrast, optimists over-weight the scenario that opponents will choose low expenditures. In multi-player games the incentives to invest can be stronger when opponents choose relatively small expenditures than under the most pessimistic scenario. As a result, optimists invest more and have a higher chance of winning. This e¤ect is especially pronounced for intermediate numbers of the opponents.
The model yields a number of testable hypotheses. It would be informative to empirically investigate these in the lab and in the …eld. To accomplish this objective, one could use a twostage procedure where in the …rst stage the subjects'attitudes to ambiguity are elicited using an Ellsberg style experimental design while in the second stage these subjects strategically interact in a contest. We leave this interesting experimental exercise to future research.
Appendix
Our proof of Proposition 2 utilizes the su¢ cient conditions for the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in Reny (1999) . The analysis relies on the following de…nitions (see Reny 
which is continuous and concave in own strategy. The only discontinuity occurs when all of the opponents choose inaction; x i = 0: Note also that this case can materialize only when x i = 0: Under this scenario, player i's payo¤ function is given by
> :
which is discontinuous but concave. Thus, all players' payo¤ functions are concave, and hence quasiconcave, in own strategies.
It is only left to verify that the game is better-reply secure. Since the latter property is a weaker requirement than continuity, the condition for the game to be better-reply secure is satis…ed at all points of continuity of a player's payo¤ function in own strategy, i.e. when P j6 =i h j (x j ) > 0 or when P j6 =i h j (x j ) = 0 and x i > 0. Moreover, when x = 0; player i's payo¤ function exhibits an upward jump and a strategy that slightly exceeds x i = 0 can secure her a payo¤ that is greater than Z i (0; 0;
Thus, the game is also better-reply secure, which concludes the proof of the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3.
From the implicit function theorem,
: Di¤erentiating (6) with respect to x and ; respectively, and using (6) we obtain
It follows from these expressions that @z(x ; ; ) @ > 0 if and only if x > (n 1)
The equivalence between (8) and condition x > x N follows from evaluating z ( ; ; ) at
Proof of Proposition 4. Inequality (10) can be written as B (n; ) > A (n; ) ;
where A (n;
Hence, when n is relatively large; A (n; ) is positive, decreasing, and convex in n: The asymptote of the graph of A (n; ) as a function of n when the latter tends to in…nity is vertical. Similarly, we have
Hence, for su¢ ciently large n; B (n; ) is negative, increasing, and concave. The asymptote of the graph of B (n; ) as a function of n when the latter tends to in…nity is vertical. Finally, A (n; ) > B (n; ) () n 4 (n 2) + 2n 2 + 1 (n 1) > 0:
Both parts of the Proposition follow immediately from (16) , (17), (18) , and (19).
Proof of Proposition 5.
From the implicit function theorem we have
It follows from the proof of Proposition 3 that @z(x ; ; ) @x < 0. Di¤erentiating (6) with respect to ; we obtain
which yields the …rst part of the proposition. The equivalence between inequalities (11) and (12) is obtained by evaluating z ( ; ; ) at (n 1) 1 p x x and comparing the resulting expression to zero:
Lemma 12 The slopes of the reaction functions at interior points (x < x i ; x j < x) satisfy @ i @x j > 0 if x i > x j and @ i @x j < 0 if x i < x j where i; j 2 fA; Bg and i 6 = j:
Proof of Lemma 12. Application of the implicit function theorem to (13) yields
which implies the lemma since all terms in the above expression except for (x i x j ) are positive.
Proof of Proposition 7. First, note that the …rst order-conditions for an interior equilibrium are:
We shall prove the result by contradiction. Suppose that there exists an EUA in which at least one of the players provides an e¤ort greater than x N A . There are three cases to consider:
We have
Similarly,
Finally,
where the …rst inequality in (24) follows because It then follows from (22) , (23) , and (24) that the left-hand-side of (20) Thus, there is no EUA in all three possible cases. The result follows.
Proof of Proposition 9. The derivative of a contestant's payo¤ with respect to own e¤ort evaluated at a point where the contestants choose the same e¤ort level x is given by
The expression in (25) evaluated at x = x is strictly positive under our assumption that (25) is strictly decreasing in x there can be only one value of x 2 (x; x) for which it is equal to zero. This value of x is the e¤ort level in the unique symmetric equilibrium. Moreover, by Lemma 13 this equilibrium is unique.
Lemma 13 Let i; j 2 fA; Bg and i 6 = j: We have 1. i (x j ) ? x j as x j 7 x ; 2. i (x j ) is increasing (resp. decreasing) on [x; x ] ; (resp. [x ; x]).
Proof of Lemma 13. First, note that since i (x j ) attains its maximum at x j = x ; The claim is proved by contradiction. Suppose that there existsx; x <x < x ; with i (x) < x: Hence, by the Intermediate Value Theorem, there must existx;x <x < x such that i (x) =x: Hence,x is a symmetric equilibrium e¤ort level. However, this contradicts uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium (Proposition 9). Hence, no suchx can exist which, in turn, implies the claim. A similar argument demonstrates that x j > i (x j ) when x j > x :
Since x i > x j for x j 2 [x; x ] ; Lemma 12 implies that i (x j ) is strictly increasing on this interval. Similarly, i (x j ) is strictly decreasing for x j 2 [x ; x] :
Proof of Proposition 10. The marginal bene…t of player i's e¤ort is given by
It follows from this expression that the e¤ect of change in i on this marginal bene…t is proportional to
which implies that as long as x j x > x 2 i > x j x an increase in i will decrease marginal bene…t of e¤ort. Since the marginal cost of e¤ort is constant, an increase in i will result in a decrease in player i's e¤ort when x j x > x 2 i > x j x: Hence, for points around the symmetric equilibrium, the best response function will exhibit a decrease. By Lemma 12, j (x i ) is increasing for x i 2 [x; x] : Hence, as a result of the shift of player i's best response curve the equilibrium will move to a point where x 
Ambiguity averse contenders
Ambiguity loving contenders
